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Edith Stein’s Philosophy of Education in The Structure of the Human 
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Abstract: Because the image we have of the human person determines educational 
practice, Stein’s philosophy of education consists in anthropology. Her main work in 
education theory falls into two parts, philosophical and theological, as both disciplines 
influence our image of the human person. The Structure of the Human Person, the first 
and philosophical part of this foundational project, constitutes Stein’s mature philosophy 
of the human person – a subject that had occupied her all her life. This article examines 
the philosophical anthropology of this work, its historical background and its place within 
Stein’s entire work. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Every work reflects the one who wrought it, the times it was forged in, and the purpose 
for which it was conceived. That is why Stein’s The Structure of the Human Person2 is a 
key not only to the entire work the author, but also to the Jewish experience in Germany 
in the nineteen thirties, and to the philosophy of education as such. It reveals Stein’s deep 
commitment to the human person, constitutes her Auseinandersetzung with National 
Socialism, and argues for the centrality of anthropology in education theory. In the 
following discussion these three aspects will be examined. First (1) we will look at 
Stein’s education theory in the context of her entire work, assessing the influence that 
education had on the elaboration of her philosophy and her understanding of the 
philosophical significance of education. Next (2) we will address the work as part of 
history: its precedents and antecedents, what occasioned it and what it, in turn, 
occasioned. Its sources constitute a significant part of its precedents, and the method a 
significant part of what it handed on. Hence these are examined as aspects of the work’s 
                                                 
1This article was first printed in REA, Religion, Education & the Arts, Issue V: The Philosophy of 
Education, edited by Dr. Ian Leask, 2005, pp. 55-70. The article is reprinted with the kind permission of the 
editors.  
2 Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person exists in two editions, both from Herder. In the following references 
are therefore given to sections, facilitating the use of either of the two: Edith Steins Werke (ESW), ed. Lucy 
Gelber and Michael Linssen O.C.D. (Basel – Freiburg – Wien, Herder, 1994), Bd. XVI; Edith Stein 
Gesamtausgabe (ESGA), ed. des Internationalen Edith-Stein-Instituts Würzburg/Klaus Mass O.C.D. 
(Freiburg – Basel – Wien, Herder, 2004) Bd. 14, sub-ed. by Beate Beckmann-Zöller. Both are hereafter 
referred to as “Aufbau”. The theological counterpart of the foundational project is as yet published only in 
ESW XVII: Was ist der Mensch?, 1994. 
 
 history. Finally, (3) the work’s structure is exhibited, beginning with Stein’s justification 
for understanding education theory as anthropology and ending with her account of the 
construction of the human person in its essential openness.  
    “Aufbau” (as in the work’s German title: Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person), 
means structure, construction, edification, and “build-up”. The literal sense of 
“edification” – the building of an edifice – gives us the active sense of the German word, 
whereas “structure” gives us the passive. Education, in German, is Bildung; close in 
meaning to the English “building”, and, like it, having the same double sense, active and 
passive: the activity of building, and the finished building resulting from the activity3. 
The human person, therefore, for Stein, is built and builds itself up according to a 
structure it has, or gets as it builds. As education literally shapes who we are, the 
structure of the human person is the central question of education theory. 
 
 
 
1. Stein’s Education Theory 
 
    When Stein composed The Structure of the Human Person in 1932, at the age of forty, 
she had spent 9 years teaching German and Latin with the Dominican nuns in Speyer. A 
lecturing career in philosophy had been denied her, but she had tutored for Husserl as 
well as privately in Breslau after she graduated in 1917, until she accepted the job as a 
secondary school teacher. Teaching was part of how Stein envisaged herself: She was a 
teacher4. 
    Her earliest phenomenological works (On the Problem of Empathy; Philosophy of 
Psychology and the Humanities; An Investigation Concerning the State5), provide the 
foundation for her later education theory. They do not explicitly touch on the topic, but 
explore the fundamental structure of the inter-subjectively constituted human person. 
Education, which so decisively contributes to this constitution, is implicitly given a 
central place awaiting development. Like any communicative practice, education projects 
an understanding of shared humanity, which it poses implicitly as goal and standard for 
the communication. This standard – the structure of the human person, who is 
communicative and stands in relation to others like it, whom it re-cognises – is brought 
out (e-ducere, ausbilden) or built up (edify, aufbauen) in education. 
                                                 
3 Edith Stein, “Die Idee der Bildung” in  Bildung und Entfaltung der Individualität (ESGA 16), sub-ed. by 
Beate Beckman and Maria Amata Neyer, 2001, p. 35 – 49. 
4 The best account of Stein’s life, apart from her own – Edith Stein, Aus dem Leben einer jüdschen Familie, 
ESGA 1 (2002); translated as: Life in a Jewish Family, by Josephine Koeppel O.C.D., in Collected Works 
of Edith Stein I (CWES), (Washington D.C, ICS Publications, 1986), – is Waltraud Herbstrith: Edith Stein. 
A Biography, translated by Fr. Bernhard Bonowitz, O.C.S.O (San Francisco, Ignatius Press, 1992).  
5 Edith Stein, Zum Problem der Einfühlung (Halle, Buchdrückerei des Waisenhauses, 1917). This work has 
not yet appeared in either ESW or ESGA. Nor has Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der 
Psychologie and der Geisteswissenschaften und Eine Untersuchung über den Staat, which are published 
together by Max Niemeyer Verlag in Tubingen, 1970. All three works, however, are translated into English 
and published in CWES: On the Problem of Empathy, translated by Waltraut Stein, as vol. III, published in 
1989; and Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, translated by Mary Catherine Baseheart and 
Marianne Sawicki as vol. VII, published in 2000. An Investigation Concerning the State is translated by 
Marianne Sawicki for CWES and is forthcoming. For a very useful chronology of Stein’s works, see 
Sawicki’s Stein-page: mysite.verizon.net/vze3cjre/steinstuff.html. 
 
     The inter-subjective setting is explored in On the Problem of Empathy, where it is 
shown how the act of empathy contributes to the constitution of the human person 
(constituted simultaneously in the self and in the other through recognition). The 
physical, bodily, psychic and spiritual aspects are all examined as dimensions that the I 
must attribute to itself (and attribute to a self in the other) in order to make sense of their 
appearance. Hence, it is shown how (i.e. in what kind of experiences) the human person 
is constituted. Education, it can be seen on this background, works consciously with the 
self-identification of the human person in its relations with all things material and 
spiritual.  
    The two treatises making up Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities (“Psychic 
Causality” and “Individual and Community”) investigate the limits of the human person 
(once again, as they are experienced, i.e. as they are constituted). The first investigates 
the limits regarding material nature (constituted as obeying the law of causality), and the 
second investigates the limits regarding the spirit (constituted by obeying the laws of 
motivation). The human person is experienced as both caused (in the state of tiredness, 
for example) and motivated (by values): The person becomes familiar with its 
individuality through its body and through the communities of which it forms part. 
Energy (Kraft) straddles the spheres of nature and spirit, and it is experienced as a 
property of the psyche which can be spent and loaded up again, precisely by drawing 
energy from these two realms – nature and spirit. It is above all this phenomenon that 
makes the I constitute itself as a person existing in relation to nature and in community, 
i.e. that makes it aware of itself. Energy manifests the individuality of the person, an 
individuality that is constantly challenged by natural forces from without and spiritual 
forces from within. Helping the individual to meet these challenges and bring his or her 
individuality to full bloom is thus assisting in the process of self-identification, the 
process of the “construction” or “Aufbau” of the human person.  
    In Individual and Community Stein also investigates how valuation is community-
forming. Whereas the valuing of the same values is not the only way in which community 
is formed, it is nevertheless an important way. Values are spiritual motivating factors, and 
when they are shared they bring people together. It is by a person’s own self-constitution 
(self-identification), that the values preferred by this person makes him share a world 
with others, who also constitute themselves in a like manner. Values, thus, make people 
share the same “structure”; the same “construction”; the same “Aufbau”. There is a 
hierarchy among these values – they are all preferred by some, but not everyone takes 
account of them all. The superficial person takes account only of the values of the 
hedonist: the values of pleasure and comfort. The less superficial person takes into 
account also the values of the hero: courage, glory and appearance. The values of the 
genius – knowledge, know-how, brilliance – mark a further depth. But with the values of 
the saint – the holy, the true, the good and the beautiful – access to the deeper depths of 
the person has been achieved6. Hence the depth of the persons directly reflects the depth 
of the spiritual community they share. But sharing values, and hence forming community, 
                                                 
6 Stein’s value theory, as well as her community theory, owes its content mainly to Scheler. See in 
particular his Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values. A New Attempt toward the 
Foundation of an Ethical Personalism, transl. by Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston, 
Northwestern University Press, 1973). However, Stein’s systematisation of Scheler’s distinctions gives a 
coherence to her account which is not found is Scheler’s.  
 
 is not the only way to live together. Association relies on agreement (not immediately on 
value response), and the forming of the masses relies on sheer physical and psychic 
togetherness. These superficial forms of communality are degrees of community, not 
reaching its full potential of spiritual communion. They are not less important for all that. 
They, in fact, constitute the “buffer-zones” in which not sharing the same values, and yet 
maintaining some sort of order, is possible. However, they are essentially fragile, volatile 
and manipulable – they cannot but reflect the superficiality of the individuals making 
them up. Education can and must open up the person to his or her own depths, as well as 
to the deeper values of the community, because the cohesion of society, its basis in 
community, depends on that. 
    An Investigation Concerning the State, finally, compares the different kinds of 
communality in and through which the person is constituted by its various acts of 
identification with values, and therefore with others. It examines, in particular, the type of 
association manifesting itself in the State and the State’s making, validation and 
confirmation of Law. Thus the constitution of the State, and of the person as a citizen, 
reaches the person as free and as decision-making, not immediately as a value-responding 
member of a community. Hence the State is fragile to the extent that its basis is, i.e. it 
may disintegrate if the ethical community (or communities) supporting it disintegrate7. 
Stein examines and explains the tension between nation (Volk) and state (Staat), as a 
tension inherent in the personal identity of each and every person contributing to the life 
of the community and/or of the State. Political dramas are therefore personal ones – of 
how to gain access to the depths, and of how to want to gain access. Stein’s engagement 
with politics therefore leads her back to the role of the educator: only the awakening of 
the depths of the person can prevent superficiality and its blind exclusion, and only 
anthropology can teach us about these depths.  
    These early phenomenological works, however, are not alone in underlying Stein’s 
education theory in Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person. A second phase of Stein’s 
philosophical development plays a major role in relation to the manner in which her 
insights matured. When Stein received baptism in 1922 she started seeking a deeper 
understanding of the Catholic tradition, and was advised to study Thomas Aquinas. 
Accepting this suggestion, she decided to translate De Veritate into German, and to 
comment on it8. Question XI is dedicated to “the teacher”, and Stein understands it to 
concern the genesis of knowledge, much as constitution does9. She found in Aquinas 
                                                 
7 Jürgen Habermas, “The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship”, 
in The Inclusion of the Other. Studies in Political Theory (Cambridge, Polity, 2002). Habermas shares 
Stein’s insight that nation and state obey each a different logic, and that the state relies on the nation to be 
what we have come to take for granted that it is. Today the problems faced by the Nation State are those of 
immigration and globalisation. The problem Stein observed taking shape was that of the allergy of the 
German nation towards its internal other: the Jews, who themselves constituted a nation – somewhat 
despite themselves. 
8 Stein wanted to make accessible the thought of Thomas Aquinas to her contemporaries. This made her 
recast his questions in treatise form, thinking the objections and their answers into the body of the text. 
Such reconstruction gave her plenty of scope for rethinking Aquinas’ thought and informing her own. The 
result is a translation and commentary all in one. Des Hl. Thomas von Aquino Untersuchungen über die 
Wahrheit (questiones disputatae de veritate), translated by Edith Stein, bd. 1-2 (Breslau, Verlag von Otto 
Borgmeyer/Buchhandlung, 1931). 
9 She sums it up in the following manner: “We are here given a brief sketch of the genesis of knowledge. 
God gives us the ‘light’ of reason, i.e. the formal power to know, and also with it certain contents, from 
 
 someone who understood the human being to be freely training him- or herself in virtue, 
and this allowed her to integrate his insights with her own empathetically-constitutive 
phenomenology, much like Aquinas had assimilated Aristotle from his Christian 
standpoint. What she learned from Aquinas was to realise the scope of her philosophical 
ambition, and to use the Aristotelian concepts of form and matter, substance and essence 
anew, in order to address problem-areas such as the relationship between finite and 
eternal being and the structure of the human person. Stein’s engagement with Thomas is 
very similar to the one she had with Husserl: she understood it to have prevented her 
from becoming one-sided10.  
    The Structure of the Human Person, together with its theological counterpart What is 
the Human Being?, testify to this integration of the old with the new. The old was, on the 
one hand, the Scholastic tradition that had provided vocabulary, method and material for 
the new phenomenology. But on the other hand “the old” was this same phenomenology, 
which had made the first sharp imprint on Stein’s mind, now making room for the “new” 
philosophia perennis. 
 
 
2. History in The Structure of the Human Person 
 
The two volumes of education theory were conceived as two parts of a course Stein was 
to teach at the Marianum at Münster, the teacher-training College where she had found 
employment after giving up her teaching engagements in Speyer. But due to the Nazi 
prohibition on Jewish professionals she did not teach the second half: What is the Human 
Being?, the theological part of the foundation for education theory that she had planned, 
was thus never given as a series of lectures, but was instead written up as a treatise. 
    The death of her spiritual director (who had insisted she did not follow her desire to 
enter Carmel immediately after she was baptised), together with her newly gained lack of 
employment, conspired to open up for her the way into the Cologne Carmel. Her last 
major works: Finite and Eternal Being and Science of the Cross were conceived and 
brought to fruition in Carmel. They continued to deepen her understanding of the human 
person and to develop, in particular, the value of its individuality. Here she graduated to 
write for “beginners” as a “beginner”11 and to follow the via inventionis along with all 
humanity. She grew to conceive herself more and more as one of many, one among 
many, searching for the meaning of Being. 
                                                                                                                                                 
which all knowledge – by acquisition of further material by means of the senses – is to be derived. In 
principle the human being does not need another teacher. It is possible that he, on the grounds of his natural 
gifts and through the work of reason, progresses and expands his knowledge to the point of full capacity in 
via inventionis. But a threefold support by created teachers is possible. He could be shown truths of a 
spiritual nature by means of sensible signs, truths deducible from principles and in this process of deduction 
actualising potential knowledge (in what way is not further stated). He could be stimulated by being 
provided with images to work as material for the reasoning activity, and he could have the formal power of 
reason strengthened. The first kind [of teaching] is open to humans and angels, but the second and third 
kinds only to angels (in what way remains in the dark)”. (op. cit. p. 324 –5). All translations from Stein’s 
works are my own. 
10 Aufbau II, II, 2. 
11 Endliches und Ewiges Sein (ESW II), 3.ed., 1986, p. xii. Finite and Eternal Being, (CWES 9), trans. by 
Kurt F. Reinhardt (2002), p. xxvii. 
 
     From her earliest youth Stein had been interested in the dynamics of community. She 
saw this as the key for understanding inter-subjectivity, and therefore for the 
understanding of what it was for anything to be – given that it was inter-subjectively 
constituted. The plight of Germany during the Depression gave her the opportunity to test 
her sociological insights, and also forced her to consider her own identity, as a German 
Jewess converted to Christianity. The Nazis shared this interest in the social: They were 
socialists – convinced of the importance of the collective identity for the individual: “The 
People” was their idol. But they were not only socialists, they were National Socialists – 
wanting to establish a socialist state for the Nation, the German Nation – which, as it 
turned out, could not recognise any limits in relation to other peoples or nations. Stein 
recognised “the People” to be of great importance. When she was deported to Ausschwitz 
she is known to have taken her sister’s hand, saying “come Rosa, we go for our people”. 
Her people, however, were those who “belonged to her”, “those who had been given to 
her” – phrases she often used in her letters reflecting, in fact, phrases used by Jesus. She 
belonged to the human race. Stein’s understanding of the ontological relationship 
between the person and his people is rooted in her value-theory, which again is rooted in 
her understanding of self-identification as something essentially mediated by others.  
    The Structure of the Human Person records her awareness of “the possibility of a 
meaningful and valuable human community life outside that of the nation” and “the 
absolute measure of the value of peoples and persons”. It is to this meaning of the 
individual, even when isolated from his community, that education must minister. 
Education has a direct social impact because it addresses the person him- or herself. The 
education Stein founds is one that recognises the importance of the nation, but also its 
relativity to the individual human person and to humanity as such.  
    She undertook this foundation in relation to the dark times she lived in. In the Zeitgeist 
of 1932 she discerned trends, more or less related to the Nazi ideology, in relation to 
which she felt she had to situate her anthropology. These trends constitute, together with 
the Phenomenological and Scholastic traditions, the sources of her work. German 
Idealism was something she was familiar with from her days as a teacher in Speyer, 
where Goethe and Herder formed part of the curriculum – and indeed part of what she 
understood to be her own German culture. She also was personally acquainted with 
Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy from her time in Freiburg, and had engaged with Sein 
und Zeit since its publication in 1926. Psychanalysis, in particular in Jung’s version of it, 
played a significant role in her interpretation of the Pseudo Dionysius12. Darwin, finally, 
she read while composing The Structure of the Human Person, and assimilated to the 
point where the only part of it she rejected was the (un-Darwinian) assertion that the 
species have evolved from one another without any external factors, such as environment 
or chance mutation, to explain evolution. Stein would likewise have assimilated 
contemporary notions in physics13, animal psychology14, anthropology15, sociology16 
and theology17. 
                                                 
12 Edith Stein, Wege der Gotteserkenntnis. Studien zu Dionysius Areopagita und Übersetzung seiner Werke 
(ESGA 17), sub-ed. by Beate Beckmann und Viki Rannf (2003). 
13 Her sources for this understanding are not clear. Probably they grew out of popular scientific articles. 
14 E.g. Max Etlinger, Beiträge zur Lehre von der Tierseele und ihrer Entwicklung (Münster, 1925). 
15 E.g. Albert Huth, Pädagogische Anthropologie (Leipzig, Klinckhardt, 1932), referred to by Stein as 
exclusively based on natural science and omitting the spiritual dimension of the human being. 
Groethungsen: Philosophische Anthropologie, in Oldenburg: Handbuch der Philosophie, Abteilung III 
 
     Her personal synthesis of Husserlian and Thomistic elements, into which she 
integrated these diverse perspectives and from which she criticised them, merits some 
further commentary. It had fallen into place through dialogue with various contemporary 
authors, mostly people she knew personally from the Göttingen Circle. The most 
important of these were Max Scheler, who had provided her with all the materials for her 
value- and community theory. But there was also Hedwig Conrad-Martius, her 
interlocutor in all matters ontological, and Dietrich von Hildebrandt, who (even though 
no personal acquaintance grew up between them) was consistently referred to in relation 
to ethics. Her synthesis equipped her with a “method”, enabling her to meet and 
assimilate different philosophical currents, without losing her feet and her ability to reach 
a critical discernment. Considering this method explicitly in The Structure of the Human 
Person she insisted it was phenomenological: “Developed by Husserl in the second 
volume of his Logical Investigations”, this method is “in my opinion used by all great 
philosophers of all times, even if not exclusively and with clear reflective 
understanding.”18 “The most elementary of principles in phenomenology [is..] to fix on 
the things themselves. Not to engage in theories [..] but to approach things, without 
prejudice, in immediate intuition [..] The second principle is: to pay attention to what is 
essential.” Taking Aquinas as guide in the choice of problems did not mean adopting his 
“system”, even less expounding his anthropology.19 The method that Stein handed on 
was, therefore, one that took into account the necessity for a starting point – insisted on 
by Descartes. It revisited the problems of the philosophical tradition before him, to find in 
it insights that could be reached from this starting-point, and to discard others, that could 
not. Finally, it criticised elements of the tradition after Descartes in the same manner, 
accepting the elements of Enlightenment, Darwinism, Psychanalysis and Existentialism 
that could be reached from the starting-point, while discarding those that could not. What 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Mensch und Character), 1931, is referred to by Stein as neglecting the systematic character of 
anthropology and replacing it with a historical exposition. 
16 She recognises her debt to F. Tönnies as the distinction between Gesellshaft and Gemeinshaft elaborated 
by him continued to play an important role for her. Cfr. Ferdinand Tonnies, Gemeinschaft und 
Gesellschaft: Grundbegriffe der reinen Soziologie (1887). Transl. as: Community and Society, by Charles 
P. Loomis (New York,  Harper and Row, 1963). 
17 The Bible is referred to a number of times, especially to exemplify the formation of the State of Israel out 
of the community of a wandering tribe as pictured in the Old Testament. Augustine is referred to when she 
defines the Catholic idea of education. Most often, however, Christian doctrine is referred to as such. It is 
understood as a living body of thought (“truths”) based on the revelation of God. An example of such a 
truth is “the human being is created by God”. Another example is “every single human soul is created by 
God”. She also refers to a specific idea of Christian, and in particular of Catholic, education (I. A. II. 2. b). 
The second volume of her education theory is a commented tapestry of statements from Denziger-
Bannwarts: Enchiridion Symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum, in the edition 
of 1928. 
18 Aufbau, II, II, 2. 
19 Such a task would be “a great and beautiful one, but would complicate mine, as I cannot simply follow 
the teaching of St. Thomas, but differ in understanding on several important points.” Aufbau, II, II, 1. These 
points concern in particular Thomas’ understanding of matter as the principle of individuation and the 
consequent lack of understanding of personal individuality, and of experience as being valuable as such. It 
is quite likely that anthropological notions based on St. Thomas became, implicitly or explicitly, part of 
Stein’s brief for founding Catholic education theory. At any rate, Aquinas’ value as a topos in this regard 
would have been considerable at the time. It is her experiential starting-point that prevents Stein from 
simply accepting Thomas’ anthropological ontology and leads her to rethink his problems by the means of 
the new method. 
 
 she handed on was thus a method integrating a tradition that would leave out nothing 
valuable20. She wanted to channel the waters of the philosophia perennis through the 
systems of modern philosophy, at the same time irrigating the lands of straying systems 
and liberating Scholastic thought. 
    As Stein fled from Germany in 1938 to the Carmelite Convent of Echt in Holland, she 
brought with her several manuscripts, including The Structure of the Human Person and 
What is the Human Being?, these were placed in a backpack by her sisters in religion and 
hidden in the cellar of the friendly convent of Herkenbosch, thought to be a safe hiding 
place. In one of the last German air raids in 1944 the convent was completely ruined. The 
partly loose, partly bound, sheets of Edith Stein’s manuscripts were rescued from the 
ruins and brought by Pater Avertanus, the Belgian provincial of the Carmelites, and Pater 
Herman van Breda OFM, the later Director of the Husserl Archives, to Louvain, where 
they were entrusted to Dr. Lucy Gelber for reconstruction21. A meticulous reconstruction 
began, which bore fruit in terms of publication only as late as 1994. The public 
Wirkungsgeschichte of the work thus began only ten years ago. This long incubation time 
means, on the one hand, that the work has not as yet attracted much specific commentary, 
and, on the other, that it comes to us fresh and pristine like a “time capsule”. The hidden 
life of her education theory has already borne many fruits, however. Stein’s life and death 
merited her canonisation, and her subsequent elevation to be in Catholic terms co-patron 
of Europe made her known world-wide as an outstanding person and an exemplary 
character. Stein was aware of the importance of such models for any educational process, 
especially that regarding oneself, and she could not have given more leadership in 
education had her works been published as she herself had hoped for. 
 
 
3. The Structure of the Human Person 
 
The Structure of the Human Person is divided into nine chapters, three of which are 
concerned with identifying the problem, establishing the method and delimiting the 
subject (the first two and the last). The remaining six chapters build the philosophical 
anthropology Stein proposes as a foundation for Catholic education theory. 
    Chapter I, “The Idea of the Human Being as Foundation for Education as Science and 
Practice”, argues that education is a practice relying in principle on an idea of the goals of 
education. “Behind all human action stands a Logos which guides it”22. This Logos 
explains the action and enables the actor to proceed meaningfully. “All education 
concerned with forming human beings is led by a certain understanding of these, of their 
status in the world and their tasks in life, as well as by the practical possibilities of 
treating and forming them. The theory of human formation, which we call education 
theory, belongs organically within an entire worldview, i.e. in a metaphysics, and the idea 
                                                 
20 “Method” could here have been put in quotation marks, to acknowledge Gadamer’s hermeneutical 
insight that truth and method cannot be separated. Cfr. H.G Gadamer,. Truth and Method, trans. ed. by 
Garrett Barden and John Cumming (London, Sheed and Ward, 1975). 
21Lucy Gelber, “Einleitung” in Aufbau (ESW XVI), p. 20. Lucy Gelber was at that time the archivist of the 
Husserl Archives. Her account of the painstaking reconstruction of the text is to be found the same place. 
22 Aufbau, I, A. 
 
 of the human being is part of this worldview by which it is immediately concerned.”23 
Even if such a metaphysics is not explicit or even conscious, and even if a professed 
worldview does not always have an impact on practice in the way that it purports to do, it 
is still at work, however obscurely, in practical education. Few people, especially 
teachers, would contest that education centrally concerns the formation of human beings. 
Some politicians and administrators however might view education in other terms, say, in 
terms of its socio-economic impact on the competitiveness of society, or as a means to 
realise certain political objectives. In such an understanding of education there also is an 
implicit worldview, namely that of education being a means to an end, where the latter 
may or may not differ from the human person itself. As Stein concentrates on the 
structure of the human person for founding education theory she implicitly affirms that 
education centrally concerns the formation of human beings for their own sake, as 
education is how they become who they are. Thereby the idea is implicitly rejected that 
education should be a form of social engineering essentially unconcerned with the life 
and nature of the individual persons being educated. Education is, according to Stein, 
about the human person. Therefore she investigates three different ideas of being human 
(German Idealism, Depth Psychology and Existentialism) all of which influence the 
contemporary vision of the human being, and thus have an impact on contemporary 
education. In German idealism “the human being [..] is free, called to perfection (to 
‘humanity’), a link in the chain of the entire human race, progressing towards perfection, 
providing every single one and every single people, because of their individuality, with a 
specific task in the development of humanity.”24 On the other hand confidence in the 
goodness of human nature and in reason, inherited from Rousseau, is unrealistic: It does 
not sufficiently take feelings and drives into account. Even if Romanticism did address 
this aspect, it did not manage to break through to rectify the idealist bias present in the 
Zeitgeist of Stein’s times. It did, however, become a precursor of Depth Psychology, for 
the development of which Russian novels also played a role. The First World War and 
the confusion surrounding it ensured that rationalist idealism was definitively conditioned 
by various alternative images of the human being, but the unity and meaningfulness of 
the soul became a casualty of the act of dethroning rationality. As a consequence of the 
inability to identify a significant core of the human being, education no longer was 
meaningful. Positively, this tendency initiated a greater awareness and appreciation of the 
urges and drives of the human being, but negatively it had the effect that psychoanalytic 
explanation replaced mutual understanding, thus distorting the trust that must exist 
between human beings for education to begin and to succeed. Existentialism, thirdly, 
operates in the depths, like psychoanalysis, but it does not consider the human being 
capable of enduring for any length of time the questions raised by its own being. The 
flight into anguish, when not preoccupied with this or that particular thing, seems to be 
the most authentic approach the existential I can make to itself. Thus education becomes 
the senseless task of destroying the various ideals in which the soul takes refuge, in order 
that it be delivered from its own non-being.  
    Over and against these three visions of the human being Christian metaphysics as Stein 
sees it, provides an alternative vision, expressing itself directly in education theory. It has 
                                                 
23 Ibid. The ambiguity is deliberate: the human being is immediately concerned by the worldview that 
includes a view of itself. 
24 Aufbau, I, A, I, 1. 
 
 a number of elements in common with the trends described. It shares with German 
idealism the conviction of the goodness of human nature, but its reason for doing so is the 
belief that the latter is created by God in his own image. Human nature is spiritual in that 
it loves and knows, and hence is directed towards, a commensurate goal of perfection 
beyond earthly existence. Thus Christian education shares with depth psychology the 
understanding that life without depth, i.e. without roots in what is not immediately 
accessible to reason, is a life misspent. Christian education reckons with the dark sides of 
human nature, so much so that it considers it a task beyond the resources of the human 
being to find the way out of their power. But through participation in Christ’s filial 
relationship with God the human being is enabled to play a role in Christ’s mystical body, 
and so to have a source of divine life in his or her own self strengthening, healing and 
enlightening both will and intelligence for deeds beyond their own intrinsic power. The 
individual is responsible for not extinguishing this life of grace, to which end the thought 
of the reward of a life in glory greatly helps. Finally, the call to authentic being, as 
glimpsed in Heidegger’s philosophy, is explained in Christian metaphysics as the 
movement from fragmentary being to wholeness in Christ. It forcefully expresses the call 
to inwardness away from the inauthenticity of the ways of the world25.  
 
To sum up we can say: seen from the standpoint of Christian anthropology the humanistic ideal is 
revealed as reflecting the integrity of the human being before the fall, but its origin and its goal is 
left out of consideration, and the fact of original sin ignored. The vision of depth psychology is 
that of fallen man, even if conceived in a static and a-historic manner: past and future possibilities, 
as well as the fact of salvation, go unheeded. Existential philosophy shows us human beings in 
their finitude and essential nothingness. It concentrates on what the human being is not, and is thus 
disconnected from what he is positively, as well as from the Absolute, which is figured behind the 
conditioned.26 
 
The Christian educator must understand him- or herself merely as a helper, or an 
instrument, of the Educator that God is. God alone knows what serves the individual best, 
and also what he or she needs to learn. The human educator can co-operate with God by 
adjusting herself or himself to the laws of the human being, and to this particular human 
being. Education theory serves this end, as do other sciences like psychology, 
anthropology and sociology; but the educational process itself must happen face to face, 
as its medium is mutual openness. When closure has occurred, which happens through 
hurt, then a turning back towards openness, which requires waiting, patience, creativity 
and faithfulness, must be initiated27. What education realises, therefore, is nothing 
extrinsic to the human being. It is reciprocal communication of grace for the realisation 
of the common destiny in the unity of the eternal Logos. “When the ideas of the human 
being are oriented towards it, then they constitute sufficient foundation for the science 
and practice of education”28.  
                                                 
25 By, for example, Augustine in Confessions and City of God. 
26 Aufbau, I, 1. 
27 “Over-activity and passivity are equally great dangers in education. The road between these two pitfalls 
is the one that the educator must move along, and he is responsible to God that he stray neither to the right 
nor to the left. Moreover, he can only move forwards while carefully probing. What must strengthen him in 
this terrible task is the thought of what makes the task so dangerous: that of God’s work with which he 
must co-operate”. Aufbau, I, 2. 
28 Ibid. 
 
     Chapter II, “Anthropology as Foundation for Education”, sets out to further investigate 
the kind of anthropology that must underlie education theory. Anthropology inspired by 
natural science is useful in order to know the functions and developmental laws of the 
human body, and to discern among these which are conducive to natural, harmonious 
development and which may produce harm. Scientific knowledge of different races also 
may be useful, in so far as individuals exemplify these, and the knowledge of them may 
further understanding of the individuals29. However, natural science is only conducive 
towards a useful educational anthropology in so far as the openness between subjects 
remains undisturbed. Scientific explanation cannot replace mutual understanding; if it 
does, education is denatured and the pupil has reason to close him- or herself off against 
the teaching proposed; or, which is the same thing, he or she would have reason to 
believe it was manipulative. As natural science possess no normative standard according 
to which humanity, individual and race can be brought into unison, it can only serve as a 
means to establish the anthropology sought for. 
    The humanities may help us towards understanding the individual. They serve as a 
“school of understanding”, but they only touch upon the efficiency of spiritual power, 
which is of crucial importance to the educator. The humanities provide 
anthropographics, and hence are anthropology in the same sense as description of 
animals is zoology. But a general anthropology, which is the science of the human being 
as spiritual person, is part of a general philosophy of the spiritual, including community, 
state, language, law and culture in general. Even if the humanities provide material for 
this, they provide no standard according to which discernment can be made of the 
importance in education of the supra-individual formations such as state, race and 
humanity. The educator must know, in his dealings with the spirit of the times, whether 
there is an objective order into which these fit. This standard must come from ethics, the 
philosophical discipline dealing with values. It is part of ontology, which makes use of 
the other sciences as befits its purpose. But this is not all: “A general ontology cannot 
limit itself to created being, but must take uncreated being into consideration, as well as 
the relationship between these. Likewise, anthropology would be incomplete, and 
insufficient as a foundation for education, if it did not consider the relationship between 
human beings and God.”30 Hence philosophical anthropology is essentially unfinished 
and can only be finalised by a theological complement. To approach this essentially open 
human person historical methods are available, but they are at once labour-intensive and 
inconclusive. Systematic phenomenology is a more direct approach, and it allows us to 
advance to conclusions.  
    Chapter III begins the construction of the anthropology proper, as it treats of “The 
Human Being as Material Thing and as Organism”. As we meet the human being, in 
ourselves and in others, it is a material thing, but it is also alive in soul and spirit. It 
reflects all levels of being, both the material and the spiritual as a microcosm. As a 
material thing, natural laws apply to it. It has symmetry in common with other living 
beings of a higher order, and likewise spontaneous movement. The materiality of the 
body ensures acoustic givenness: The material thing that the human being is, not only 
                                                 
29 “The individual is not isolated, but is a member of supra-personal formations such as a people and a race, 
and the task of the educator is to form him, not only as individual, but as a member of the whole”. Aufbau, 
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 “sounds” when struck from the outside, but “sounds” first and foremost out of its own 
initiative, as it moves itself first and foremost out of its own initiative. 
    Chapter IV, “The Human Being as Animal”, investigates how the human being shapes 
itself by its own initiative, internally, into a shape called by Aristotle “life-soul” (yuxh/). 
This life-soul makes the organism, from its material, into a living being that moves. The 
power that the soul exercises over the body expresses itself in sensitivity and free 
movement, and its spirituality opens it towards both the outside and the inside. “‘Having 
soul’ means having a centre in which all registering computes that comes from without, 
and from which everything appearing in bodily attitude to come from within is brought 
forth.”31 As in plants, the human soul searches upwards for light. As in animals, it 
responds to drives or instincts, in a manner, however, less secure than they.32 The 
characteristics displaying themselves in the body-build and the character of soul of 
animals, is that of the species. “There seems to be no individuality there, which as such 
would have meaning”.33 However, “only a deeper analysis could convincingly establish 
that this marks an essential difference between animal and human: that in humans 
individuality gets a new sense, which cannot be found in any subhuman creature.”34 
“Thus a difference in the theoretical treatment of humans and animals becomes clear: we 
do have parallel disciplines in zoology and anthropology, which investigate human and 
animal nature, human races and animal species in their generality, but we have no parallel 
to individualising humanities for animals.”35 The importance of the individual in humans 
is accompanied by other changes in their animality. The register of sounds is expanded 
into a language, the potencies of the soul are unlimited and therefore it requires choice for 
any of them to be developed. The human species has specific characteristics, and all 
human persons are of this species. There is, however, no species of human persons – they 
are all individuals. 
    Chapter IV concerns “The Problem of the Origin of the Species” and the relationship 
between “genus, species and individual”. The level of complexity observable in the 
different species suggests the possibility of order. This gives rise to the question of 
whether this order can be conceived of as an order of descent, or “whether the species 
could be thought to have come from one another, and ultimately from one original 
form.”36 “Herewith the ground of description of facts is left behind; an explanatory 
hypothesis is proposed which must be supported either by general laws or by experiment 
and observation.”37 The first possibility of support by general laws is beyond 
experimental science, and the second possibility of support by experiment can only yield 
species that seem to constitute an “in between” with regard to other species. That the 
hypothesis, of Darwinian theory remains a hypothesis does not preclude it from being 
correct; but whatever its status, the notion of species needs clarification. “So far it has 
been used in a double sense: as an inner form shaping the animal and as the sum of all 
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animal; to her, rather, living beings are either plants or animals.  
33 Aufbau, IV, 3. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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 individuals which exemplify this form.”38 When biologists speak of the “origin” of the 
species, they seem to imply a change of the form, or an origin of the form. The form, 
however, is what makes the individual as well as the species identifiable as the same 
throughout its development. In the most primitive forms of reproduction, i.e. cloning, the 
individual reproduced differs from its parents only in respect of external factors. If, 
therefore, a-sexual reproduction could give rise to new species, external factors such as 
the environment must be able to impact on the essence of the individual, to change its 
descendants into a new type of individual. “If the creation of new individuals may be 
derived from a new creative impulse, then it is possible to think that the forms originated 
in procreation also are carriers of a ‘new’ form; no necessity persists according to which 
this qualification should be sought in the procreating individuals. Only when one thinks 
one can, and must, derive every new form from the old alone, must one ask for the causes 
of the changes in the procreating individual.” Sexual reproduction gives great scope for 
variation as the gametes of two procreating individuals interact, and thus the formation of 
new species from old ones is “essentially possible, but not necessary”.39 “It is possible 
that the plurality of forms relies on a plurality of independent principles. It is also 
thinkable, however, that there exists a principle regulating the entire domain, in which 
one transition from part-form to part-form took place within a great developmental 
order.”40 “Such laws would belong to the factual order of the created world; they would 
dictate the possibilities existing in principle, which make a world constituted like ours 
real or thinkable.”41 At the same time, such laws would not explain away the spirituality 
of the human person. 
    Chapter VI addresses “The Animal in Humans and the Specifically Human”, and 
hence what exceeds the species in the person. According to the manner in which humans 
realise their potential, choice and responsibility is added, in contrast with animals. We 
regard people as being responsible for what has become of them, as the human being 
“can and must form himself”42, because he is an “I”, i.e. a spiritual pole, characterised by 
consciousness, openness and freedom. By this “I” he can realise himself, and from this 
“can arises the possibility of the ought”.43 The “I” must form the self, i.e. the entire 
animal nature belonging to it, as well as intentionality and freedom. To this conscious 
formation and responsibility there is no parallel in the subhuman animal kingdom. It is 
the person who, as an I, has a “spiritual sense, which only is accessible in its own 
awareness of itself”44. This I, the person, has a body and a soul, and these are the self that 
it is responsible for. It carries this responsibility by searching, finding, and not losing 
itself, i.e. by reaching the depth of soul sufficient for the understanding of its own self 
and its tasks. It thus must “take itself in hand”, experience the ought, and look around for 
others of whom it might think: such an “I” should I be. 
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would not follow as a superficial popular philosophy would have it, nor would the Biblical creation 
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43 Ibid. 
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     In Chapter VII, “Soul as Form and Spirit”, Stein criticises Thomas’ doctrine of the 
unity of substantial form. She thinks that the “personal-spiritual soul determines largely 
the form of the body, but not alone”45. The soul’s openness to the spiritual world makes 
its separability from the body intelligible, as the spiritual soul, “the dominant form, which 
decides the telos, is one and can be seen as the authentically substantial one, even if the 
concrete substance is not determined exclusively through it.”46 What the entirety has in 
common is energy, a force that can be replenished from the material world, from others 
and from values. But even the energy is marked by the source from which it comes, and 
the soul’s access to its depth is required for it to interpret and integrate its energies, and 
for the will to unite. The will, then, can receive powerful support from the will of God. 
    Chapter VIII, “The Social Being of the Person”, addresses the last and very important 
aspect of the human being. The point of view on the human being we have adopted so far 
is in fact an abstraction: the human person is not an isolated individual, but is determined 
by its social acts, functions and relationships. “Communities grow spontaneously, either 
from shared life conditions and life in common (school class, village), from genetic 
descent (family, tribe, people), or – under the influence of free acts – by reason of 
personal reciprocal positioning and mentality (friendship, marriage), or because of 
common acceptance of a domain of values (scientific or artistic interest-groups, 
community of believers). Mostly more, sometimes all, of these community-forming 
factors are in play at once.”47 From such belonging to various communities, the 
individuals come to be of various types (Irish, father of a family, middle class). A people 
is distinct from the individuals constituting it, in that its experience as such is distinct 
from the experience of the individuals constituting it. Whereas a person is deeply in debt 
to his people, whose language and culture he has assimilated to constitute his own person, 
the individual is nevertheless not dependent for her final value and meaning on her 
people, but on God alone. “The deepest and the most personal of what the human being 
is, he owes to God alone, and all that he owes to earthly communities, he owes because of 
God.”48 “There is in every human being a place which is free of earthly bonds, which 
does not come from other human beings and is not determined by other human beings.”49 
Even as a person can be called to put all his powers at the service of his people, he can 
also be called out on his own. “From the order of salvation it becomes clear that even a 
completely separate life, cut off from the world, can be fruitful for humanity.”50 
    Chapter IX: “Transition from the Philosophical to the Theological View of Human 
Beings”, examines the ways in which philosophical anthropology must be completed by 
theological anthropology. Because anthropology relies on ethics to furnish it with criteria 
for judging the relative importance of humanity, people and individual, and furthermore 
because such criteria are explained and justified in theology in a manner more easily 
accessible than in philosophy, educational anthropology remains dependent on 
theological anthropology. Only the latter will render anthropology so complete that it 
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 gives sufficient reasons for the education (Aufbau) of the human person, because only it 
accounts for and justifies its infinite value in relation to the Absolute.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have seen that The Structure of the Human Person marks a high point from which 
Stein’s entire work can be surveyed. It develops an educational theory at the confluence 
of metaphysics and phenomenology, underlining at the same time the intersubjective 
constitution of the human person and her dependence on God alone for her final worth. 
The work also provides a privileged outlook on the Nazi German ideology of the 
“people” by someone who not only did, but also was willing to, pay for this outlook with 
her life, for the sake of her “people”. And finally, the work insists that anthropology is 
the key to education, while at the same time proposing just such an anthropology for 
discussion. This anthropology, however, cannot be completed without truths revealed 
about the human person, truths affirming and making intelligible what can be understood 
only confusedly by natural reason. By knowing the structure of the human person in its 
essential openness to a theological completion, we know, as much as natural reason 
allows us to, what the person can do and be supposed to do. The role of the educator is to 
empower the human being to take charge of his or her own education and build up the 
human person in him- or herself and, because it cannot be done except in reciprocity, in 
his or her others. Education is thus, according to Stein, everyone’s task, just as, and 
because, becoming a person also is.  
 
 
 
 
